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DA UBERT v MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.:
"GENERAL ACCEPTANCE" REJECTED
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2786
(1993)
Harlan Watkinst
INTRODUCTION
The "general acceptance" standard of Frye v. United States'
the dominant standard for determining the admissibility of novel sci-
entific evidence at trial for the last 70 years - has been abandoned by
the United States Supreme Court in the case of Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2 This casenote briefly outlines the facts of
Daubert, addresses the "general acceptance" standard of Frye and its
relationship with the Federal Rules of Evidence, and discusses the new
standard provided by the United States Supreme Court governing the
admissibility of scientific evidence in federal court.
FAcrs
The petitioners were two minor children, Jason Daubert and Eric
Schuller, and their parents. Both of the children were born with seri-
ous birth defects. They sued the respondent, Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals (Merrell Dow), in California state court, alleging that
their birth defects were caused by their mothers' use of Bendectin dur-
ing pregnancy.3 Respondent Merrell Dow removed the suits to federal
court on diversity grounds.
Before trial, but after extensive discovery, respondent moved for
summary judgment on the ground that petitioners were unable to pro-
duce any admissible evidence that Bendectin causes birth defects in
humans.4 The petitioners opposed the respondent's motion for sum-
mary judgment with testimony from eight qualified experts, all of
whom possessed impressive credentials. The petitioners' experts con-
Copyright © 1994 Harlan Watkins.
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1. 293 F. 1013 (1923).
2. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
3. Bendectin is a prescription anti-nausea drug marketed by Merrell Dow. Id. at 2791.
4. Merrell Dow submitted an affidavit from a "well-credentialed expert" on the risks of
exposure to various chemical substances in support of its motion for summary judgment. The
affidavit essentially was a detailed review of all the literature on Bendectin and human birth
defects, comprising over 30 published studies that involved over 130,000 patients. Id.
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cluded that Bendectin does cause birth defects in humans based upon a
variety of studies conducted with animals that found a causative link
between Bendectin and animal malformations at birth. Additionally,
the petitioners' experts reanalyzed previously published epidemiologi-
cal studies and demonstrated similarities between the chemical struc-
ture of Bendectin and other substances that are known to cause birth
defects.
Applying the Frye "general acceptance" standard, the District
Court granted the respondents' motion for summary judgment.5
Given the vast body of epidemiological data concerning the effect, or
lack thereof, of Bendectin upon humans, the court held that expert
opinion not based on epidemiological evidence is not admissible to
establish causation. Therefore, the petitioners' studies involving ani-
mals and Bendectin were inadmissible. The petitioners' evidence that
was based upon epidemiological data - the reanalysis and recalcula-
tion of previously published epidemiological studies - was inadmis-
sible because the reanalysis and recalculations were not published and
thus not subject to the typically rigorous process of peer review.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the trial court's decision, citing the Frye "general accept-
ance" standard.6 The court held that the methodology of the
petitioners' experts could not be considered "generally accepted" be-
cause the practices of those experts diverged significantly from the
procedures established by the recognized authorities in the field. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to determine
the proper standard for the admission of expert testimony in federal
court.7
THE FRYE GENERAL ACCEPTANCE TEST
In Frye, the defendant, on advice of counsel, took a systolic
blood pressure deception test (a precursor to the modem polygraph or
"lie detector" test) prior to trial. The defendant's counsel then at-
tempted to offer testimony regarding the results from the scientist who
conducted the test. The prosecutor objected, and the trial court sus-
tained the objection. On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that "the systolic blood pressure deception
test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among
physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts
5. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
6. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
7. Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
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in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, develop-
ment, and experiments thus far made."' The court also stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to de-
fine. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized sci-
entific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.9
This now famous passage was the genesis of the Frye "general
acceptance" test, which has been the dominant standard for determin-
ing the admissibility of novel scientific evidence at trial for the last 70
years.' 0
THE FRYE TEST AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.," the United
States Supreme Court held that the Frye "general acceptance" stan-
dard was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, specifically by Rule 702.12 The Daubert opinion is divided
into two separate sections. The first discusses the relationship be-
tween the Frye standard and the Federal Rules of Evidence. The sec-
ond section focuses upon the type of inquiry that should be made by
the trial judge when determining the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence in general.
8. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923).
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. California courts expressly adopted the Frye test in the 1976 case People v. Kelly, 549
P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976). Additionally, several California courts employed the theory of the Frye
test before Kelly expressly adopted it. See, e.g., Huntington v. Crowley, 414 P.2d 382, 388 (Cal.
1966); People v. Jones, 343 P.2d 577, 588 (Cal. 1959); People v. Wochnick, 219 P.2d 70, 72
(Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
The California Kelly/Frye test has three distinct prongs all of which must be satisfied: (1)
General acceptance in the relevant scientific community; (2) testimony from a properly qualified
expert regarding the technique and its application; and (3) proof that the correct generally ac-
cepted procedures were applied in the particular case under review. See People v. Fierro, 821
P.2d 1302, 1318 (Cal. 1991); People v. Morris, 807 P.2d 949, 980-81 (Cal. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 421 (1991). The third prong was Kelly's addition to the Frye test, in large part
because of the criticisms leveled at Frye for failing to include a "determination of reliability in
the particular case before them." People v. Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d 836, 862 (1991).
11. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
12. Rule 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. Evro. 702.
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The Court, through Justice Blackmun, first held that the Frye test
had been superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. 13 The Court began its analysis with Federal Rules of Evidence
401 and 40214 in order to contrast the liberal relevance standard of the
Federal Rules with the much more stringent common law "general
acceptance" admissibility test of Frye.'5 While common law, such as
Frye, under certain circumstances might serve as an aid to the applica-
tion of the Rules,' 6 in this case the co-existence of Rule 702 and Frye
is impossible as the two standards are inconsistent with one another.17
Rule 702 does not establish or require "general acceptance" as an ab-
solute prerequisite to admissibility in either the text of the Rule or in
the Rule's legislative history. 8 Furthermore, the stringent Frye "gen-
eral acceptance" standard is directly at odds with the liberal eviden-
tiary policies of the Federal Rules as well as the Rules "'general
approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to "opinion" testi-
mony.""'9 For these reasons, the Court also rejected the argument that
either the Federal Rules as a whole, or Rule 702 by itself, impliedly
assimilated the Frye standard.2"
After holding that Frye was superseded by the adoption of Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 702, the Court next provided some guidance to
federal trial court judges with regard to the proper standard for the
admission of any scientific evidence, novel or otherwise. Thus, the
post-Frye, Rule 702 "reliability" approach envisioned by the majority
is as follows:
13. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793.
14. Rule 401 provides: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401.
Rule 402 provides: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by
the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant
is not admissible." FED. R. EvID. 402.
15. Frye is "deliberately intended to interpose a substantial obstacle to the unrestrained
admission of evidence based upon new scientific principles." People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240,
1245 (Cal. 1976). See also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir. 1985)
(Critics of the Frye standard have generally cited two problems associated with it: vagueness and
conservatism.).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984) (common law interpretation of
admissible evidence to show bias found useful).
17. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794 ("Frye made 'general acceptance' the exclusive test for
admitting expert scientific testimony. That austere standard, absent from and incompatible with
the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials.").
18. Id.
19. Id. (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
20. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
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Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony... the trial
judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a),
whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowl-
edge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a
fact in issue. This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically
valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can
be applied to the facts in issue.2 '
Rule 702's requirement of scientific knowledge thus goes to the relia-
bility of the technique, while the requirement that the evidence assist
the trier of fact goes primarily to the relevance of the offered
evidence.22
According to the Court, at least four factors should be weighed
while undertaking the two-step Rule 702 "reliability" inquiry. In men-
tioning these factors, however, the Court stressed that it was not pro-
viding a definitive test or list. 3 Rather, the following factors were
merely "general observations."'24
The first factor involves whether the theory or technique that pur-
ports to be scientific knowledge can be tested, i.e., whether the partic-
ular theory or technique can be falsified .2  Any information that
purports to be a scientific explanation must be capable of being tested.
"'[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability,
or refutability, or testability.'- 26
The second factor concerns whether the theory or technique in
question has been subjected to peer review. 7 One element of the peer
review process that the court acknowledged as particularly important
was publication, 8 the assumption being that publication increases the
likelihood that substantive flaws in the methodology will be detected
by others.2 9 Nevertheless, the Court did emphasize the possibility that
certain reliable propositions might be too new, or of too limited inter-
est to be published. 0 Thus, "[tihe fact of publication (or lack
thereof) in a peer-reviewed journal.., will be a relevant, though not
21. Id. at 2796.
22. Il at 2795.
23. Id. at 2796. See also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238-39 (3d Cir.
1985) (a variation on the reliability approach with a slightly different set of factors).
24. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
25. Id
26. Id. at 2797 [quoting K. POPPaR, CoNJECrnEs AND REPUTATIoNs: THE GROWTH OF
ScmarNmc KNowt.wE 37 (5th ed. 1989)].
27. Daubert, 113 S. CL at 2797.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a par-
ticular technique or methodology on which an opinion is premised."31
Next, in the case of a particular scientific technique,32 the trial
court should consider the known or potential rate of error, and whether
sufficient standards exist to control the technique's operation. 33 Obvi-
ously, a technique known to have a high rate of error and performed
without any regulatory guidelines would be less likely considered
valid scientific knowledge and probably would be of little assistance
to the jury, implicating concerns of both the reliability and the rele-
vance of the offered evidence.
Finally, the court stated that the Frye standard of "general accept-
ance" might still play a role in the admissibility inquiry. "Widespread
acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence
admissible, and a 'known technique that has been able to attract only
minimal support within the community' may properly be viewed with
skepticism."34
CONCLUSION
The crucial difference then between the Frye "general accept-
ance" test and the Rule 702 "reliability" test is the size of the barrier
that each standard imposes upon the admission of scientific evidence,
and the nature of the inquiry imposed upon the trial judge. The goal
of Frye is that the trial judge, as a lay person, should not be required to
assess the reliability of a complicated scientific technique, but rather
should only conduct an overview of the subject that is sufficient to
disclose whether scientists significant in either number or expertise
oppose a particular technique as unreliable.35 The aim is not to deter-
mine whether there are more supporters than detractors, or whether the
judge feels that the supporters are right and the detractors are wrong.36
The point is that if two significant groups, both in number and exper-
tise, cannot agree that a technique is reliable, then that technique is not
generally accepted.37 The standard is thus a substantial obstacle to the
31. IL
32. The Court mentions spectrographic voice identification technique as one example.
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797. Other forensic techniques such as restriction fragment length
polymorphism DNA typing would also presumably qualify.
33. Il
34. l
35. People v. Brown, 709 P.2d 440, 450 (Cal. 1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nom,
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
36. People v. Wallace, 14 Cal. App. 4th 651, 660 (1993) (citing People v. Barney, 8 Cal.
App. 4th 798, 819 (1992)).
37. Id
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unrestrained admission of evidence based upon new scientific
principles.38
On the other hand, under the Rule 702 "reliability" approach, the
trial judge's task is simply to assess whether the offered expert's testi-
mony rests upon a reliable foundation and is relevant.39 Theoretically,
then, evidence based on a scientific technique that is not generally
accepted within the relevant scientific community, may nonetheless be
admitted if the trial judge believes that the technique is both relevant
and reliable. This result is possible notwithstanding the existence of a
controversy in the scientific community with regard to the technique,
which of course would prevent the evidence from being admitted
under Frye.4° The liberal standard of Rule 702 is accordingly more
consistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules of Evidence.4'
38. See supra note 14.
39. The Third Circuit compared the two standards: "The reliability inquiry that we envi-
sion is flexible and may turn on a number of considerations, in contrast to the process of scien-
tific 'nose-counting' that would appear to be compelled by a careful reading of Frye" United
States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985).
40. "A 'reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit identifica-
tion of a relevant scientific community and an express determination of a particular degree of
acceptance within that community."' Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct.
2786, 2797 (quoting Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238).
41. The Court was careful, however, to emphasize that Rule 702 "reliability" assessment
does not end the analysis. Other applicable evidentiary rules, such as those regarding unfair
prejudice and hearsay play a significant role in evaluating the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence. Once the evidence is admitted, other conventional devices, including cross-examination,
contrary expert testimony, and jury instructions, as well as summary judgment, directed verdict
and judgment as a matter of law, remain for attorneys and the courts to use against shaky but
admissible evidence.

